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Abstract: Under what conditions do critical events trigger large-scale public discussion and 
mobilisation, and can these lead to policy change? In a comparative study of nuclear energy policy 
after the Japanese Fukushima disaster in March 2011, a theory-development approach is adopted, 
mobilising data collected from national news agencies’ newswires, public surveys, legislation and 
parliamentary databases, and newspaper editorials in 12 established democracies between March 2011 
and March 2013. The analysis suggests two main hypotheses that can guide future research: critical 
events are more likely to trigger policy change when intense (contentious) mobilisation from policy 
challengers aligns with the views of the general public, and is backed by major political allies; and 
critical events are more likely to trigger intense (contentious) mobilisation when policy challengers 
articulate their opposition around pre-existing policy debates on the issue, and resort to pre-existing 
organisational and mobilisation resources. 
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The effects of the Fukushima disaster on nuclear energy debates and policies: 
A two-step comparative examination 
 
Introduction 
Before the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, in 2011, public opinion polls showed 
increasing acceptance of nuclear power (Pidgeon et al. 2008: 72). Nuclear energy was 
increasingly depicted as ‘green’ and pitched as the solution to global climate change, 
especially in the United States and Canada (Culley et al. 2010; Duffy 2011). However, after 
the Fukushima incident, several European governments reconsidered their position towards 
nuclear power. In Germany, seven reactors were shut down immediately for three months and, 
later, it was decided that the whole nuclear programme should be phased out by 2022 (Jahn 
and Korolczuk 2012; Meyer and Schoen 2017). The Italian government decided in May 2011 
to reverse its previous decision to restart the nuclear energy programme. In Switzerland, 
parliament decided in June 2011 not to replace reactors and to phase out nuclear energy by 
around 2034. Nonetheless, in many countries the accident in Fukushima stirred very little 
political debate and failed to trigger a policy change.  
 
In light of these observations, we question how a critical event can shape political 
mobilisation and debates, thereby shaping policy decisions. We study the case of nuclear 
energy policy after the Fukushima disaster with the aim of teasing out the interconnections 
between political opportunities and the political processes that ensue after a critical event and, 
occasionally, lead to major policy change. A critical event is defined as an unexpected 
event — sometimes also called a 'shock' — that triggers an increase in policymakers’ 
attention to a given issue and might have consequences for policy-making. Critical events, 
such as accidents, are thought to affect the tactical opportunities that movements face 
(Staggenborg 1993), and major policy change often requires an external perturbation 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999; Birkland and DeYoung 
2013).  
 
Interestingly, although scholarship on government responsiveness has focused on how public 
opinion shifts affect policy change (Manza et al. 2002), less attention has been paid to how 
and through which mechanisms critical events influence policy change. While a number of 
studies have examined how major nuclear accidents (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and 
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Fukushima) have influenced public opinion on nuclear energy (Eiser et al. 1989; Verplanken 
1989; Lindell and Perry 1990; Bolsen and Cook 2008; Visschers and Wallquist 2013; Siegrist 
et al. 2014; Latré et al. 2017), limited research has focused on whether and how this change 
in public opinion influenced government policy (but see, e.g., Birkland 1997; Flam 1994b). 
 
Drawing on scholarship on social movements and policy responsiveness, our core argument 
is that a critical event opens a window of opportunity for large-scale opinion and protest 
mobilisation, which social movements may or may not take up efficiently, and this uptake, in 
turn, influences the possibilities for policy change. We thus propose analysing the link 
between critical events and policy change as a two-step process. As a first step, contextual 
factors and political opportunities shape the likely effect that a critical event may have on the 
opinions and mobilisation of the public. In particular, prior mobilisation on the issue shapes 
the ability to use the opportunity window offered by an external perturbation to intensify 
mobilisation. In a second step, the effect of mobilisation on policy change will be shaped by a 
range of contextual factors and political opportunities, such as the scale and intensity of 
contentious collective action, the consistency between collective action and public opinion, 
the degree of countermobilisation by other actors, and the siding of political allies. 
 
To illustrate and refine this two-step approach to the link between critical events and policy 
change, we examine the sequence of events that followed the nuclear accident in Fukushima. 
We rely on a novel dataset, which records public debates on the nuclear energy issue on a 
daily basis between March 2011 and March 2013 in 12 countries: Belgium, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. By following a theory-development process-tracing strategy (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013), our goal is not to test a theory of policy change but rather to contribute 
to theory-development and formulate hypotheses that may be tested in future research. Our 
data suggest that, in countries where favourable political opportunities and contextual factors 
were present before Fukushima, large-scale protests indeed had an impact on short-term 
policy changes. Only on the rare occasions when challenger actors can count on both 
considerable prior mobilisation experience and favourable political opportunities can a 
critical event provide a sufficient window of opportunity to trigger a responsive change in 
policy.  
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How do critical events affect public opinion and mobilisation?  
Critical events can affect public opinion and mobilisation directly and indirectly. They 
increase public grievances and public attention to the issue influenced by an event, but more 
importantly, they can make authorities more receptive to movement demands, thus affecting 
movements’ tactical and political opportunities (Staggenborg 1993: 321). Past research 
indicates that large-scale nuclear accidents — as one type of critical event — can alter the 
public’s acceptance of nuclear power. However, the existence of a direct link between the 
critical event (the nuclear accident) and mobilisation around nuclear energy is less clear. In 
his study of collective action in relation to nuclear accidents, Gamson (1988) argued that the 
impact of a critical event was affected by prior organising. A movement that had previously 
built both information and mobilisation infrastructures was better positioned to make the 
most of a critical event. Similarly, in his study of mobilisation after the Three Mile Island 
nuclear accident in Pennsylvania in 1979, Walsh (1981) found that the strength and 
orientation of groups before the accident, in combination with public grievances, explained 
differential responses. Relatedly, Koopmans and Duyvendak (1995) argued that whether the 
Chernobyl catastrophe of 1986 triggered a change in the public mood and/or increased anti-
nuclear protest activity depended largely on the domestic political climate with which the 
accident coincided. 
 
Overall, past research suggests that a critical event only triggers increased mobilisation when 
the political context contributes to the opening of the political space for social movements’ 
actions, which subsequently can help them influence policy. Political opportunity approaches 
(e.g., Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam 1996) are therefore important to understand the long-term 
strategies of anti-nuclear movements (e.g., Kitschelt 1986, Flam 1994b), but they are also key 
in accounting for the capacity to seize the immediate opportunity that a nuclear catastrophe 
brings for promoting their anti-nuclear message amongst both the masses and political elites 
(e.g., Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Midttun and Rucht 1994; Ho 2014). 
 
However, the range of factors considered to affect social movement success in the field of 
political opportunity studies (see, e.g., Meyer 2004) has grown over time, leading to little 
consensus on what this ‘umbrella’ concept means and what it can (and cannot) explain. Here, 
we shift the focus from long-term stable features of the political context to the short-term 
conjunctural opportunities that are likely to affect the possibilities for challenging a policy 
immediately after a critical event. We thus identify four main elements that, as we theorise 
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below, are likely to be critical because they shape the ability to mount a credible challenge to 
the policy status quo: the presence or absence of a political consensus around the given issue 
among the political elites, whether the critical event coincides with an ongoing policy debate 
around the given issue, the prior distribution of public preferences and views around the issue, 
and the prior levels of contentious mobilisation around the issue. As such, we focus both on 
the political elites and the masses when considering the factors affecting the ways in which 
critical events can trigger policy change. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the salience and contentiousness of the nuclear energy issue increased after 
Fukushima, (re-)opening questions about the safety and usefulness of nuclear power. We 
argue that this critical event was a driving force that reactivated underlying attitudes – both 
amongst political elites and the general public ⎯ that had been shaped by past similar critical 
events. Indeed, the post-Chernobyl scenario offers substantial variation in changes in public 
opinion, with countries such as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 
becoming more anti-nuclear, while France and Belgium became more pro-nuclear. But it also 
varied in terms of mobilisation, as anti-nuclear protests increased in Germany and 
Switzerland (where parties were divided on the subject of nuclear energy and anti-nuclear 
movements had mobilised the public even before Chernobyl) whereas no significant change 
occurred in France or the Netherlands (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995, various chapters in 
Flam 1994a). Thus, the political opportunities for capitalising on the critical event differed 
substantially across the contexts, directly affecting the extent of popular mobilisation. 
 
We argue that the Fukushima accident served as a trigger that activated — rather than 
transformed — latent attitudes towards nuclear energy as well as dormant mobilising 
resources in the anti-nuclear movement. Thus, we examine whether and how public opinion 
shifted and protest mobilisation varied in line with the following political opportunities: prior 
anti-nuclear sentiment, prior anti-nuclear mobilisation after Chernobyl, the position of major 
parties (with government potential) on nuclear energy, and the presence of an ongoing policy 
debate about either phasing-in or phasing-out nuclear energy. 
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How do critical events affect policy? 
The record of evidence on the link between critical events, public mobilisation, and policy 
reactions is mixed (Flam 1994a; Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995; Kolb 2007; Franchino 
2014). While scholarship suggests a connection between the structural features of political 
opportunities, it is less clear about the effect of the specific window of political opportunities 
that a critical event opens. For example, policy changes following mobilisation campaigns 
are more likely in polities with highly open political input structures and with strong 
implementation capacities in the political output structures (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 
1995).  
 
Equally, it is unclear whether the opportunities that a critical event might bring for 
heightened mobilisation are consequential. Social movement scholars have attributed the 
success and failure of movement and protest mobilisation to more structural political 
opportunities rather than to the scale and intensity of protest. In particular, Kitschelt (1986: 
72) argues that ‘we should not expect policy impacts to be attributable to the overall scale 
and intensity of protest but rather to vary, within limits, independently of them’. This 
expectation is largely supported by comparative research showing that the influence of 
protest on policy outcomes is limited (e.g., Giugni 2004, 2007) or moderate at best (Burstein 
and Linton 2002), and it is likely to dissipate when public opinion is included in the picture. 
According to this logic, the strength of the mobilisation against nuclear energy after the 
Fukushima accident should not on its own be expected to affect policy change. 
 
Indeed, some have argued that the impact of protesting minorities is conditional on the views 
of the silent masses – public opinion. Changes in public opinion might have a stronger effect 
on governmental actions if they are accompanied by consistent protests (Agnone (2007: 
1597). This Agnone calls the ‘amplification’ mechanism; on certain issues, the subdued 
masses need the support of ‘noisy’ protesters to make themselves heard. In a sense, we could 
view protesters as the vocal segment of an ‘issue public’ (Krosnick 1990). The amplification 
effect thus will depend on how large the issue public is to start with, and whether the general 
public converges with the positions of the issue public and with the importance attributed to 
the issue.  
 
Consistent with these arguments, research on policy congruence and responsiveness suggests 
that governments strategically adjust their policies to voters’ preferences and demands in 
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situations of possible vote loss (e.g., Page 1978; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008). How much 
governments react to changes in policy demands will depend on their anticipation of voters’ 
electoral punishment (Soroka and Wlezien 2010), and voters are more likely to punish 
unresponsiveness or poor performance on issues they care about. As a consequence, we 
should not expect governments to pay much attention to demands on issues that the public 
cares little about (Page and Shapiro 1983) or on which the views of the public are divided or 
unclear. The scale and intensity of a protest is one signal that governments might use to learn 
about how much the public cares about an issue, and the consistency with the views of the 
public at large will signal whether voters are cohesively expressing a clear opinion that might 
result in an electoral loss if the message is ignored (see Gillion 2012). Therefore, we should 
only expect governments that face simultaneous large-scale anti-nuclear public debate and 
protest activity to change their policy in an anti-nuclear direction.   
 
However, the low-voiced masses and ‘noisy’ issue publics need at least some of the political 
elites on their side. These amplification mechanisms depend on the availability of political 
allies, who need to be credible but not necessarily in government (Giugni 2004; 2007: 54). 
They need to provide incentives for the government to react in favour of those mobilising 
against the government’s preferred policy by stirring a perception of vulnerability in future 
elections. This leads us to focus on the stance that opposition parties take after the critical 
event, but also on other institutional actors (e.g., subnational governments) and the media. 
The articulation and mobilising strength of the alternative position on the issue (here, the pro-
nuclear position of the energy industry) are also important, as they compete for the support of 
the potential allies. As a result, studying in detail the interplay between mobilisation, 
countermobilisation, and political alliances (Flam 1994b; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996) is 
crucial for understanding when governments will change their policy after a critical event.  
 
Based on the discussion above, we examine how policy change after Fukushima was shaped 
by: the intensity and scale of anti-nuclear public debates and protest activities, along with 
their consistency with the views of the general public on nuclear energy; the stance taken by 
potential allies (the opposition, other institutional actors, and/or the media) in the nuclear 
energy debate following the accident; and the countermobilisation and strength of the nuclear 
energy industry and its allies. In so doing, we seek to contribute to theory development 
around the political processes and dynamics that intervene in shaping the effect a critical 
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event can eventually have on public policy. Figure 1 summarises the two-step process model 
that underpins our empirical analysis.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
 
Data and methods 
Our primary interest is to disentangle the possible interconnections between political 
opportunities and political processes that followed the Fukushima accident in order to 
understand what factors might lead to policy change after a critical event. We do so by 
employing a thick-description and process-tracing theory-development approach that is 
deployed following the two-step process model depicted in Figure 1. Thus, we are interested 
in tracing the processes that lead to mobilisation as a first step towards understanding which 
processes may lead to change in policy.  
 
Process-tracing generally involves ‘attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the 
causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable’ (George and Bennett 2005: 206-7). Given our purposes, 
we use an approach that is similar to what Beach and Pedersen (2013) called ‘theory-building 
process-tracing’. Such a strategy can be used ‘when we know an outcome (Y) but are unsure 
about its causes’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 16), and the approach differs from the 
‘explaining-outcome process-tracing’ method in important ways. While the latter ‘focuses on 
building a minimally sufficient explanation of the outcome in an individual case’, the former 
‘seeks to build a midrange theory describing a causal mechanism that is generalizable outside 
of the individual case to a bounded context’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 16). The key 
difference between the original theory-building process-tracing method and our use of it is 
that the former is meant to be purely inductive, whereas we aim at further developing and 
specifying existing theoretical approaches guided by the arguments put forward by scholars 
studying social movement and policy responsiveness. Still, our goal is the same, as we intend 
to use this approach to formulate hypotheses that can be more systematically tested in future 
studies. 
 
We focus on established Western democracies only, and our unit of analysis is a country. We 
do not include Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries because our examination of 
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prior anti-nuclear mobilisation relies primarily on accounts of protest and public opinion in 
the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. Although CEE countries experienced 
environmental mobilisation after Chernobyl and this critical event helped catalyse the 
environmental movement in the region, the accident happened when these countries had state 
socialist regimes, and both democratic opposition rights and access to information about the 
accident were severely curtailed (Carmin and Fagan 2010). We also only consider countries 
where, by 2011, nuclear energy was produced and/or where there was a debate, prior to the 
Fukushima accident, about using nuclear energy in the near future. Our study thus includes 
12 Western democracies, of which 11 (Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were 
producing nuclear energy in 2011 and one (Italy) was actively debating nuclear energy 
production (Kriesi 2017; Aarts and Arentsen 2017; Swyngedouw 2015; Bern and Winkel 
2013; World Nuclear Association 2014; ResponsiveGov project data collection).  
 
The majority of our data comes from the manual coding of the content of the (main) national 
news agencies’ newswires in each country, complemented with exhaustive and systematic 
searches in opinion poll sources, legislation databases, and parliamentary archives (see 
Lühiste et al. 2017 for details on all sources and the codebook). For each country, we 
determine the initial policy positions by assigning a score for each government on an ordinal 
scale from -2 (very anti-nuclear) to +2 (very pro-nuclear) depending on the government’s 
position, as expressed in the coalition agreement (for coalition governments) or in party 
manifestos (for single party governments) for the elections prior to the Fukushima accident 
(see Online Appendix for information about the coding categories). Using the same coding 
categories, we also code the government’s final policy position at the end of the policy case 
period, which is normally 31 March 2013.1 However, if the government reacted substantively 
(e.g., with a U-turn) before 31 March 2013, the date of that policy shift by the government 
marks the end of data collection; or if general elections took place a minimum of six months 
after 11 March 2011, the date of the general elections marks the end of the coding period. 
The final position is established by the coder ⎯ and supervised by the core research team ⎯ 
based on the statements on nuclear energy made by the government as captured through the 
newswires and in legislative/government documents during the coding period. 
                                                
1 This date was chosen because data collection started in April 2013 and it was essential to establish a cut-off 
date (when all cases would end) as a common censoring date. 
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At the time when the Fukushima nuclear accident occurred, only two of the 12 national 
governments’ initial policy positions were considered anti-nuclear: Belgium and Spain (the 
only countries with clear nuclear phase-out policies; see Table 1). By the end of the coding 
period, four governments are classified as having an anti-nuclear energy policy position: 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain. While Spain retains the same policy position, the 
former three governments made a U-turn on nuclear energy policy following the Fukushima 
accident. However, Belgium made the opposite U-turn from an anti-nuclear governmental 
policy position to a more pro-nuclear governmental policy position, as it reversed prior 
phase-out plans by implementing a considerable delay. All the other national governments 
considered here held, to a greater or lesser extent, pro-nuclear policy positions both before 
and after Fukushima.  
 
We also collected data on interim changes in these government policy positions (if any) and 
on the multiple types of expressions of views, preferences, and demands on nuclear energy 
from a range of social and political actors for the same period. Assisted by a detailed 
dictionary of relevant keywords to detect the relevant pieces, we manually coded all news 
stories in national press agencies’ newswires relating to nuclear energy policy, all survey 
reports in which public opinion about nuclear energy policies are presented, all parliamentary 
question and answer sessions and changes in legislative acts relating to nuclear energy, and 
all editorials discussing nuclear energy policies in one ‘progressive’ and one ‘conservative’ 
broadsheet newspaper in each country (Lühiste et al. 2017). 
 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
 
 
The unit of coding is an event: a claim, declaration, report, or action. We coded various 
events, including interviews, speeches, policy proposals, parliamentary debates, court rulings, 
blog posts reported, referenda, elections, demonstrations, and boycotts (Lühiste et al. 2017). 
For each event, up to three actors and their policy positions were coded in relation to the 
government’s initial policy position. An actor can be both an individual and/or an 
institution/organisation. Each actor’s policy position was coded in relation to the 
government’s initial policy position. An actor’s position can be radically more anti-nuclear (-
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2), slightly more anti-nuclear (-1), the same (0), slightly more pro-nuclear (1), or radically 
more pro-nuclear (2) than the government’s initial policy position. In order to summarise 
whether different sets of actors hold anti-nuclear or pro-nuclear views, irrespective of the 
initial government position, actors’ positions were recoded from a relative scale to an 
absolute scale (see Online Appendix for details).2  
 
Following our theory-development process-tracing approach, our analysis aims at providing a 
thick description of how events, political debates, and policy reactions unfolded. For this 
reason, all the data analyses are primarily descriptive and we do not deploy hypothesis-
testing multivariate analyses, either quantitative or qualitative. Instead, we provide a 
thorough comparative description of how the specific window of political opportunities 
provided by the Fukushima accident, prior patterns of public sentiment and protest 
mobilisation, posterior patterns of mobilisation and countermobilisation, and their alignment 
with the silent majority and with key political allies interact in each of these 12 cases to lead 
to the final outcomes observed. We then examine the patterns of interaction between these 
various factors and consider whether they suggest a causal process that may lead to the 
presence or absence of policy change.  
 
 
The context prior to the Fukushima disaster 
We first provide a very brief overview of the context before Fukushima. The 12 countries 
under examination differ significantly concerning the range of political opportunities 
expected to intervene in the intensity and following of anti-nuclear mobilisation (see an 
overview in Müller and Thurner 2017). The conditions for large-scale anti-nuclear 
mobilisation were ideal in Italy and Germany, as the majority of the public in both countries 
was clearly against nuclear energy (Eurobarometer 2011), both countries had experienced 
large-scale anti-nuclear protests after the Chernobyl accident (Kolb 2007; Kousis et al. 2008: 
1632), some major political parties opposed nuclear energy, and there was an active ongoing 
phasing-in (Italy) and phasing-out (Germany) debate taking place in both countries (Jahn and 
Korolczuk 2012).  
                                                
2 The Krippendorff Alpha values for the inter-coder reliability tests for the main variables are: Type of event 
(0.82), Number of protest participants (0.95), Type of actor specific (0.81), Policy position relative to 
government (0.89), and Direction and intensity of position (0.81). Details are reported in the Online Appendix. 
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Some of the favourable opportunities for anti-nuclear mobilisation were present in Spain and 
Belgium, where nuclear energy phase-out plans were in place before Fukushima. Yet both 
countries were considering modifying these plans. The Belgian coalition government tried to 
reverse the phase-out decision but did not manage to bring a bill to parliament before the 
Fukushima accident due to a government crisis (Swyngedouw 2015: 3). Spain decided to stop 
the construction of any new plants in 1983 and also had a phase-out plan, with the last reactor 
due to close in 2018, yet this plan was altered under the second Zapatero cabinet in February 
2011. The majority of the main left-wing and Green parties in Belgium and Spain were 
supportive of nuclear phase-out policies. Additionally, the majority of Spaniards were against 
the use of nuclear energy (Eurobarometer 2011). However, in Spain anti-nuclear mobilisation 
after the 1986 Chernobyl accident was less successful than in Italy or the Netherlands; in the 
following three years two new reactors were connected (Franchino 2014). 
 
Before Fukushima, the Swiss were also actively debating the merits and disadvantages of 
nuclear power and the government was actively planning to replace three nuclear power 
reactors (Siegrist and Visschers 2013). Though the major Swiss parties (except the Greens) 
were pro-nuclear, the anti-nuclear movement had considerable experience in mobilising large 
portions of the public, whose anti-nuclear majority had considerably increased immediately 
after Chernobyl (Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995).  
 
In Canada (Fried and Eyles 2011; Bratt 2005), the Netherlands (de Groot and Steg 2010), and 
Finland, only one of the four favourable conditions – some political opposition to nuclear 
power – was present before Fukushima. In contrast, none of the four favourable political 
opportunities was present in the remaining four countries: France (Brouard et al. 2013; 
Brouard and Guinaudeau 2014), Sweden (Nohrstedt 2009), the United Kingdom (Pidgeon et 
al. 2008), and the United States.  
  
The dynamics of public debate and mobilisation on nuclear energy after Fukushima 
How much attention and public debate did the nuclear disaster in Fukushima trigger in these 
12 countries? Figure 2 summarises the total number of events per month in each country over 
the entire period studied. In all countries, the highest number of events occurred during the 
first month (March 2011) following the Fukushima accident. Naturally, verbal statements 
constitute the most common type of event, but meetings and debates are also fairly common, 
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reflecting the organisation of parliamentary deliberations and meetings on nuclear safety. 
Countries with the liveliest debate are also those where political decisions concerning nuclear 
energy were more commonly adopted, especially during the first months after Fukushima.3 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
 
Countries with the most favourable political opportunities are, in general terms, more likely 
to display more intense debates. In Germany and Italy, more than 500 events happened 
during March 2011 alone. Nuclear energy also attracted considerable attention in Spain (192 
events) and Switzerland (130 events) in that first month. Contrary to expectations, nuclear 
energy was also heatedly debated in France (186 events in March 2011), despite the 
traditionally more cohesive pro-nuclear stance of the leading parties. A large number of 
events (138 in March 2011) were also tracked in the United States, but most relate to nuclear 
safety rather than nuclear energy policy. Given the relatively unfavourable political 
opportunities in Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, it is 
unsurprising that relatively little debate was tracked in these countries after Fukushima. 
 
Although at least one of the government parties in Belgium and Finland was against nuclear 
energy and there were government coalition negotiations taking place shortly after 
Fukushima (March-December 2011 and April-June 2011, respectively), there was little 
public mobilisation. While the Green parties in these two countries tried to include nuclear 
energy policy in the coalition agreement discussions, the negotiations had a limited impact on 
the intensity of public debate around the issue. There were also large cross-national 
differences in the number of protest events reported. Protests were more frequent during the 
first few months in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, and Switzerland than in the remaining 
seven countries, and these were also the countries with intense involvement of collective 
action actors (e.g., anti-nuclear civil society organisations and social movements). Given the 
nature of the issue, nearly all protests were advocating anti-nuclear positions. The pro-nuclear 
side primarily expressed their views and demands through statements and meetings. The few 
exceptions were small-scale protest actions by workers at nuclear plants in France that voiced 
pro-nuclear stances.  
                                                
3 A detailed graph by type of event is reported in Figure A1 in the Online Appendix. 
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Table 2 summarises the number of protest events and the total number of participants (per 
million inhabitants) recorded by country. These figures show that countries where anti-
nuclear mobilisation was high following Chernobyl ⎯ Germany, Italy, and Switzerland ⎯ 
(Koopmans and Duyvendak 1995) are also those where proportionally larger numbers of 
people mobilised against nuclear energy after Fukushima. France and Spain are exceptions to 
this pattern and differ in one important way from the other three: while the total number of 
protest events is large in these two countries, the maximum relative turnout at any single 
protest event is relatively low. Hence, French and Spanish protesters, unlike their German, 
Swiss, and Italian counterparts, never reached a ‘critical mass’ at any given protest event. The 
data also show that where fewer protest events took place after Fukushima, such events 
tended to be more confrontational. In most countries, confrontational protests involved a 
small number of Greenpeace or other anti-nuclear organisation activists who either tried to 
disrupt nuclear waste transportation or to enter nuclear power plants. 
 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
 
The question thus arises as to whether the positions of the general public were consistent with 
protesters’ demands. Figure 3 depicts the change in public opinion, as measured through 
surveys, after Fukushima.4 Before Fukushima (horizontal axis), public opinion was already 
significantly anti-nuclear in Germany, Spain, and Italy (countries to the right of the red 
vertical line), while after Fukushima (vertical axis), the general public held clearly anti-
nuclear views also in Belgium and Switzerland (countries above the red horizontal line). 
                                                
4 Where available, the following survey question (with minor variations) was used for Figure 3: ‘Please tell me 
whether you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose each way of producing 
electricity. What about nuclear energy?’ Responses that indicate support for nuclear energy (‘strongly support’ 
+ ‘somewhat support’) were used for calculating the share of population in favour of nuclear energy. In the 
cases of Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland, a different survey question was used to measure support for nuclear 
energy before Fukushima: ‘In your opinion, should the current level of nuclear energy as a proportion of all 
energy sources be reduced, maintained the same, or increased?’ Responses that indicate support for nuclear 
energy (‘maintained the same’ + ‘increased’) were used for calculating the percentage in favour of nuclear 
energy. 
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Hence, in these five countries the anti-nuclear movement benefitted from having public 
opinion ‘on their side’. Although Finland, the Netherlands, and France also witnessed some 
protest activity (see Table 2), public sentiment in these countries was and remained pro-
nuclear. 
 
The dashed diagonal line in Figure 3 serves to indicate the countries where the public became 
either more or less anti-nuclear following Fukushima. The closer the country point is to the 
dashed line, the less public opinion on nuclear energy changed as a result of the Fukushima 
disaster. Interestingly, in many countries public sentiment was not affected much by 
Fukushima. However, it became significantly more anti-nuclear in Belgium, Italy, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, although in the latter country the 
majority of the public remained favourable to nuclear energy.  
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
As we discussed earlier, which side the various political and institutional actors took after the 
critical event is thought to be important, and so is the degree of countermobilisation by the 
opposite side in the conflict. Thus, we examine the direction of preferences expressed in the 
events by the various actors involved. Germany, Spain, and Belgium are the only countries 
where all types of actors, except for the nuclear industry, took anti-nuclear positions more 
often than pro-nuclear ones (see Figure 4). Hence, in these countries, anti-nuclear 
mobilisations were supported by several political allies. In contrast, in Finland,5 Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States,6 most or all types of actors, except for collective 
action and public sphere actors, displayed mostly pro-nuclear positions. Thus, in these 
countries anti-nuclear protesters had few (if any) allies among institutional actors. 
 
In the remaining countries, there was limited public consensus concerning nuclear energy and, 
interestingly, national opposition actors took primarily anti-nuclear positions while national 
governments ⎯ typically centre-right ⎯ expressed pro-nuclear preferences. These 
                                                
5 The Finnish Green party (in national government) campaigned for the government not to issue any new permit 
for the building of nuclear plants. However, most statements made by the Green party are considered pro-
nuclear because they did not demand an overall nuclear phase-out. 
6 Most statements of civil society actors in the United States were only considered slightly more anti-nuclear 
than the US government’s initial policy position on nuclear energy and so are classified as pro-nuclear.		
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governments’ pro-nuclear positions are in line with previous scholarship that suggests that 
both political elites and the general public who hold right-of-centre views take a more pro-
nuclear energy stance (Kuklinski et al. 1982; Rothman and Lichter 1987; Plutzer et al. 1998).  
 
 
<Figure 4 about here> 
 
 
Yet, in order for political allies to be effective, their opposition to government policy needs to 
be sustained over time, and in Figure 5 we show the extent to which this was the case after 
Fukushima. As Green parties can be considered to own the anti-nuclear issue position, and 
are by default political allies of the anti-nuclear movements (except the lukewarm Finnish 
Greens), we excluded them from the analysis.  
  
<Figure 5 about here> 
 
 
Shortly after the accident, the majority of statements made by Belgian, German, and Spanish 
parties were against nuclear energy. While the Spanish and German governments and 
opposition parties remained largely anti-nuclear, the Belgian parties (except the Greens) 
became pro-nuclear over time. In Switzerland and Italy the opposition parties were against 
nuclear energy from the start, while government parties became gradually more anti-nuclear. 
Despite the fact that the Swedish opposition parties were consistently anti-nuclear, the 
governing parties sustained their endorsement of nuclear energy. For Canada, Finland, France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, Figure 5 confirms the results of Figure 4: the 
anti-nuclear movement finds little support in the major political parties, other than the Greens. 
Thus, only in a few countries did those mobilising against nuclear energy find the sustained 
and active support of a broad range of political allies.   
 
 
Tracing the impact of the public debate and mobilisation on nuclear energy policy after 
Fukushima 
Our findings show considerable cross-national variation in the extent and nature of the public 
debate and mobilisation around nuclear energy after Fukushima. But what effect, if any, did 
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they have on governmental nuclear energy policy? Following our theoretical discussion of 
the two-step approach to policy change after a critical event, we should only expect a policy 
change yielding to pressure from the public after a critical event when favourable pre-existing 
political opportunities offer policy challengers a window of opportunity that they can 
efficiently use to mobilise their support groups, and intense mobilisation aligns with public 
support and the mobilisation of strategic political allies. How did the patterns and dynamics 
uncovered by our analysis conform to these expectations?  
 
Table 3 outlines the absence and presence of favourable political opportunities for policy 
change before (section 3A) and after Fukushima (section 3B). Only in five countries – 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland – are two or more conditions fully met. All 
criteria are fulfilled in Italy, while in Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium three conditions 
out of four are fully met. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Italian government decided to reverse 
its nuclear energy policy: the public was vocally against nuclear energy and took their 
demands to the streets. Furthermore, the nuclear industry lobby remained relatively silent, at 
least as recorded by the media. Despite the fact that the nuclear industry was quite vocal in 
Germany and, especially, in Switzerland (see Figure 4), nuclear energy policy was radically 
changed in these two countries as governments agreed to phase-out plans. Thus the three 
countries that witnessed the largest anti-nuclear mobilisations are also the countries in which 
a policy change towards anti-nuclear positions happened. Indeed, even if the U-turn was less 
costly in the Italian case because the nuclear programme was only recently re-launched, this 
was not the case in Germany and Switzerland, where 28% and 38%, respectively, of energy 
production came from nuclear power. Thus, these findings suggest that protests and their 
magnitude may matter and, indeed, be a key factor. 
 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
 
This argument is further strengthened because Belgium, where most of the conditions were 
fulfilled except for large-scale protests, was the one country that decided to reverse the 
nuclear phase-out policy. Nevertheless, the Belgian government reversed its policy towards a 
pro-nuclear position more than one year after Fukushima, and when the Green parties that 
adopted the 2003 phase-out plan were no longer included in the governing coalition, and 
hence were less influential political allies of the little-supported anti-nuclear movement. 
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Undoubtedly, Belgium’s heavy reliance on nuclear power was the underlying motivation for 
this policy reversal, but it remains an open question whether the Belgian government could 
have backtracked on its original phase-out commitment had anti-nuclear mobilisation been 
intense and sustained.  
 
In other countries where the public debate was significant but less intense, such as France and 
Spain, one or several favourable conditions for policy change were not fully met. In 
particular, the anti-nuclear movement lacked either organisational resources dating back to 
the Chernobyl mobilisation cycle or sufficient support for their anti-nuclear mobilisation on 
the streets after Fukushima. In Spain, the absence of organisational resources was 
exacerbated by having to confront a Socialist government that was moderately anti-nuclear 
and pledged a phase-out of nuclear energy, alongside the clearly pro-nuclear position of the 
largest opposition party (the Popular Party).  
 
Thus, another pattern that emerges from our findings is that policy challengers are only able 
to seize the window of opportunity that a critical event brings when the policy issue was 
prominent on the agenda prior to the shock, and they can deploy pre-existing organisational 
resources and mobilisation experience to mount a credible challenge. This would suggest that 
the two-step process of mobilisation and policy change that we proposed (Figure 1) shows 
promise and should be more systematically assessed in future research.  
 
Conclusions 
We have examined conditions under which a critical event triggers large-scale public 
discussion and mobilisation, and whether the instigated discussion and mobilisation facilitate 
a policy change. We argued that both large-scale mobilisation and policy change require a set 
of favourable political opportunities. Past scholarship suggested that these conditions are 
essential in accounting for the anti-nuclear movement’s capacity to seize the opportunity that 
a nuclear accident brings to get their anti-nuclear message across (Kitschelt 1986; Koopmans 
and Duyvendak 1995). By adopting a theory-development process-tracing approach, we 
analysed nuclear energy debates and policy courses after Fukushima as an illustrative case of 
the dynamics of interest, employing a comparative dataset of 12 established democracies. 
 
In line with theoretical expectations, the data suggest that both intense anti-nuclear 
mobilisation and subsequent policy change happened only where the situation was ‘ripe’. 
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Indeed, the nuclear accident in Fukushima did not trigger large-scale public debates about 
nuclear energy, large-scale anti-nuclear mobilisation, or policy changes in most countries 
under examination. However, all three coalesced in Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, where 
intense and heavily attended anti-nuclear protests were amplified by widespread anti-nuclear 
views among the general public as well as among some major (national and regional) 
political allies. In Italy and Germany, there was also considerable anti-nuclear sentiment prior 
to Fukushima. In these two countries, the anti-nuclear movement efficiently ‘used’ the 
window of opportunity presented by the nuclear accident to mobilise the public and to 
persuade their respective governments to discard nuclear energy. In Switzerland, however, 
the anti-nuclear movement had first to win over the general public (pro-nuclear before 
Fukushima) and only then was it able to press the government into agreeing to a phase-out 
that marked a substantial policy change. 
 
In the remaining nine countries political opportunities were less favourable, and there was 
limited anti-nuclear mobilisation. While anti-nuclear protests occurred in France, Spain, and 
Finland, they attracted considerably lower turnout; protesters there were also less able to 
forge alliances with major political parties and the general public than in Italy, Germany, and 
Switzerland, and no substantial policy change ensued. Hence, our study suggests the need to 
re-examine Kitschelt’s (1986) argument that the size and extent of anti-nuclear protests do 
not affect the likelihood of policy change. After a critical event, and under the right 
conditions, the intensity and following of protests seems to have a critical impact on short-
term policy changes.  
 
Our study builds on previous comparative work on the interaction between anti-nuclear 
movements and political elites that highlighted key factors but hesitated to formulate general 
patterns to long-term nuclear energy policy outcomes (Midttun and Rucht 1994; Thurner, 
Müller and Schulze 2017) and to political responses to the anti-nuclear movement (Flam 
1994c). We move forward this debate by focusing instead on short-term episodes or junctures 
of policy-making around nuclear energy and by identifying a set of common features that 
seem to account well for the anti-nuclear movement’s mobilisation success and its impact on 
short-term policy change after a critical event. Slicing the study of policy responses into 
shorter periods enables a more detailed consideration of the various interactions between 
political opportunities and actors' strategies and seems a promising avenue for future research. 
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Our descriptive analysis confirms the importance of critical events for boosting movement 
mobilisation and public anti-nuclear sentiments. Yet external shocks alone are not sufficient 
to trigger policy change. Instead, our study suggests a reformulation of the likely effects of 
critical events to make them conditional on favourable opportunities that are best understood 
as developing in two (analytical) steps: Critical events are more likely to trigger policy 
change when intense (contentious) mobilisation from policy challengers aligns with the views 
of the general public and with the backing of major political allies; and critical events are 
more likely to trigger intense (contentious) mobilisation when policy challengers can 
articulate their opposition around pre-existing policy debates on the issue and can resort to 
pre-existing organisational and mobilisation resources. These hypotheses should be tested in 
future research employing systematic theory-testing qualitative or quantitative methods. 
 
The policy area we focused on ⎯ nuclear energy ⎯ is characterised by critical events that 
are dramatic and potentially devastating. However, not all shocks that affect policy debates 
⎯ whether environmental or otherwise ⎯ are as dramatic and devastating as nuclear 
accidents. Thus, while we know that policies are shaped by the lessons extracted from 
disasters (Birkland 2006), it is an open question as to whether our finding (that protest 
magnitude seems to matter when combined with other favourable political opportunities) is 
generalisable across policy issues. Environmental issues are not often particularly salient and 
exciting per se, but critical events can turn them into issues that are both obtrusive and 
specific. 
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Figure 1. Two-step approach to the dynamics and processes that unfold after a critical event  
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Figure 3. Public rejection of nuclear energy before and after Fukushima (survey results) 
 
Sources: Special Eurobarometer 324 (Sep-Oct, 2009); Demoscope (Jan, 2010); TNS Sifo in World Nuclear 
News (Feb, 2010); Gallup Politics (Mar, 2010); Ipsos Reid (Apr, 2010); Special Eurobarometer 364 (Feb 2011); 
WIN-Gallup (Apr, 2011); Ipsos (Jun, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The share of anti- and pro-nuclear positions expressed in all events by different actors (entire time period) 
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Figure 5. Share of anti- and pro-nuclear actions by political parties (by week until June 2011) 
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Table 1. Nuclear energy policy positions before and after the Fukushima accident across all countries studied 
Country (and 
Government) 
% of nuclear 
in energy 
production 
(2010/2011) 
New reactor plans prior 
to Fukushima? 
Phase-out 
agreed by Government 
Initial position on nuclear 
energy before Fukushima 
(or at gov't inauguration for 
2nd & 3rd gov'ts) 
Final governmental 
policy position on 
nuclear energy after 
Fukushima 
Belgium (1) 
2010-2011 51.1% Moratorium 2025 Caretaker government (CD&V) -1 (Anti-nuclear) -1 (Anti-nuclear) 
Belgium (2) 
2011-2014 54% 
Phase-out aborted in 
2012  CD&V, PS, MR, CDH (Di Rupo) -1 (Anti-nuclear)  1 (Pro-nuclear) 
Canada 15.1% 2 new reactors planned  CP (Harper)  2 (Very pro-nuclear)  2 (Very pro-nuclear) 
Finland (1) 28.4% 1 in construction; 1 planned  
KESK, KOK, VIHR, RKP-SFP 
(Kiviniemi)  1 (Pro-nuclear)  2 (Very pro-nuclear) 
Finland (2) 31.6% 1 in construction; 1 planned  Caretaker government (KOK)  2 (Very pro-nuclear)  1 (Pro-nuclear) 
Finland (3) 31.6% 1 in construction; 1 planned  
KOK, SDP, VIHR, VAS, RKP-SFP, 
KD (Katainen)  1 (Pro-nuclear) 1 (Pro-nuclear) 
France 74.1% Sarkozy: 40 years extension  UMP, NC (Filion; Sarkozy)  2 (Very pro-nuclear)  1 (Pro-nuclear) 
Germany 28.4% Moratorium 2022 CDU/CSU, FDP (Merkel)  1 (Pro-nuclear) -2 (Very anti-nuclear) 
Italy None Moratorium, new reactors debated  PDL, LN, MPA (Berlusconi)  2 (Very pro-nuclear) -1 (Anti-nuclear) 
The 
Netherlands 3.4% 
Building of 1 reactor 
postponed in 2012  VVD, CDA (Rutte)  2 (Very pro-nuclear)  1 (Pro-nuclear) 
Spain 20.1% 
Moratorium on new 
plants. License 
extensions possible  
PSOE (Zapatero) -1 (Anti-nuclear) -1 (Anti-nuclear) 
Sweden 38.1% Replacement of existing reactors allowed  MSP, FP, C, Kd (Reinfeldt)  1 (Pro-nuclear)  1 (Pro-nuclear) 
Switzerland 38% Moratorium 2034 
SVP-UDC, SP-PS, FDP-PRD, CVP-
PDC, BDP  
(Schneider-Ammann) 
 2 (Very pro-nuclear) -1 (Anti-nuclear) 
United 
Kingdom 15.7% 
Up to 8 new reactors 
planned  CON, LD (Cameron)  2 (Very pro-nuclear)   2 (Very pro-nuclear) 
United States 19.6% 
5 under construction, 6 
expected to start 
operating by 2020  
DEM (Obama)  2 (Very pro-nuclear) 2 (Very pro-nuclear) 
Source: International Atomic Agency, World Nuclear Association, OECD Nuclear Agency, and ResponsiveGov project coding for the initial and final government positions. 
Note: The Premier's party is underlined in the case of a coalition government. 
Table 2. Number of protest participants per million inhabitants and number of protest events 
  Number of protest events & participants 
in March-May 2011 
Number of protest events & participants (per million inhabitants): 
entire coding period 
  
Country Number 
of 
protests 
% 
confrontational 
protests 
Max. 
number of 
protesters 
in any 
event 
Number 
of 
protests 
% 
confrontational 
protests 
Max. 
number of 
protesters 
per event 
Mean 
number of 
protesters 
per event 
Median 
number of 
protesters 
per event 
Number 
of online 
and 
offline 
petitions 
IT 19 16% 300,000 19 16% 5,000 634 0.2 0 
DE 41 10% 200,000 41 10% 2,500 259 6.3 0 
FR 22 14% 26,000 56 20% 962 41 3 4 
CH 14 21% 14,500 14 21% 1,750 265 93.8 2 
NL 4 0% 5,000 7 29% 313 84 11 1 
ES 19 11% 2,000 24 8% 217 19 6.7 1 
FI 4 25% 950 8 50% 190 59 35 1 
US 6 0% 600 26 0% 3 0.7 0.2 6 
UK 1 0% 100 6 50% 16 9 9 1 
SE 1 100% 20 3 100% 8 5 5 0 
CA 6 83% 20 10 60% 3 0.5 0.1 1 
BE 3 33% 1 7 29% 4 2 1.9 1 
 
Note: Countries are ordered by the maximum number of protesters in any single event in the period March-May 2011. In Italy, the number of protest events and protest 
participants (per million inhabitants) reflects the time period of March-April 2011 only. The computation of the protest variables excludes petitions, which are reported 
separately. Values in columns 7 to 9 are computed by dividing the maximum, mean, and median number of protesters per event by the country’s population size in millions 
and then multiplied by 1 million. Coding period: starting date common to all countries (11 March 2011); ending dates are: Belgium (31 March 2013), Canada (31 March 
2013), Finland (31 March 2013), France (6 May 2012), Germany (30 May 2011), Italy (20 April 2011), the Netherlands (12 September 2012), Spain (20 November 2011), 
Sweden (31 March 2013), Switzerland (25 May 2011), the United Kingdom (31 March 2013), and the United States (31 March 2013).
 
 
 
Table 3. The configuration of political opportunities before and after the Fukushima nuclear 
accident and the policy outcomes 
             
3A: Before Fukushima             
  IT DE CH BE ES NL SE FR CA FI UK US 
Anti-nuclear position by gov't 
before Fukushima 
   x x        
Large anti-nuclear sentiment x x  
 
x      
  
Large-scale anti-nuclear protests x x x 
 
      
  
Siding of political allies with 
anti-nuclear protestors 
x x  x x x   x + 
  
Ongoing policy change debate x x x x x 
       
             
3B: After Fukushima             
 IT DE CH BE ES NL SE FR CA FI UK US 
Large anti-nuclear sentiment x x x x x        
Large-scale anti-nuclear protests x x x     +     
Siding of political allies with 
anti-nuclear protestors 
x x x x x + x +     
Limited nuclear industry 
countermobilisation 
x   x + x       
Anti-nuclear position by gov't 
after Fukushima 
x x x  x        
Policy change in anti-nuclear 
direction after Fukushima 
x x x          
 
Notes: x = condition fulfilled; + = condition partly fulfilled; bold = countries in which a policy change happened. 
Sources: Kriesi (2017), Aarts and Arentsen (2017), Swyngedouw (2015), Bern and Winkel (2013), and 
ResponsiveGov project data collection (all information for section 3B of the table). 
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Online Appendix (not for publication) 
 
“The effects of the Fukushima disaster on nuclear energy debates and policies: 
A two-step comparative examination” 
 
 
 
 
Government’s initial and final policy position 
 
For each country, we determine the initial policy positions by assigning a score for each 
government on an ordinal scale from -2 (very anti-nuclear) to +2 (very pro-nuclear) 
depending on the governments’ position, as expressed in the coalition agreement (for 
coalition governments) or in party manifestos (for single party governments) for the 
elections prior to the Fukushima accident. Category ‘-2’ is assigned to governments that 
are against any plans of building new power plants and committed to close all existing 
power stations within the next 10 years. Category ‘-1’ is applied if the government is 
generally against the building of new power plants and committed to close some or all 
existing power stations in a more distant future. Category ‘+1’ is used if the government 
does not intend to close any power stations but also does not plan to build any new ones. 
Category ‘+2’ is applied if the government has a long-term commitment to nuclear 
energy, manifested in (the plans to) building new nuclear power stations. For more 
information on coding categories, see Lühiste et al. (2017). 
 
 
Actor’s policy position relative to the government’s initial policy position 
 
Each actor’s policy position is coded in relation to the government’s initial policy 
position. Coders can choose between five categories: an actor’s position is radically 
more anti-nuclear (-2), slightly more anti-nuclear (-1), the same (0), slightly more pro-
nuclear (1), or radically more pro-nuclear (2) than the government’s initial policy 
position (see Lühiste and Morales 2016 for more information). 
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Actor’s policy position recoded 
 
In order to summarise whether different sets of actors hold anti-nuclear or pro-nuclear 
views, irrespective of the initial government position, the data are recoded as follows:  
- If the government’s initial policy position is anti-nuclear (-1), then all actors 
whose position is coded as -2, -1, or 0 are considered to be anti-nuclear energy 
and all others as pro-nuclear energy.   
- If the government’s initial policy position is pro-nuclear (+1), then all actors 
whose position is coded as 2, 1, or 0 are considered to be pro-nuclear energy and 
all others as anti-nuclear energy. 
- If the government’s initial policy position is very pro-nuclear (+2), then only 
actors whose policy position is coded as -2 are considered to be anti-nuclear 
energy and all other as pro-nuclear energy. 
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List of Keywords: English 
 
Nuclear 
Nuclear + energy 
Fukushima 
Daiichi 
Radiation+ safety 
Atomic + energy 
Atomic + power 
Radioactive 
Nuke + plant 
Power plant 
Energy + policy 
Green + energy  
Survey + energy  
Survey + Fukushima 
Poll + energy 
Poll + Fukushima 
Protest + energy 
Protest + Fukushima 
Demonstration + energy 
Demonstration + Fukushima 
Declaration + energy 
Declaration + Fukushima 
Claim + energy 
Claim + Fukushima 
Greenpeace 
Expert* + energy 
Expert* + Fukushima 
Uranium 
 
Instructions: In order to speed up the process of searching for news stories, search for 
all the keywords at once by separating them with “OR”. See below for the example in 
English: 
Nuclear OR Fukushima OR Daiichi OR (Radiation AND safety) OR (Atomic AND 
energy) OR (Atomic AND power) OR Radioactive OR (Nuke AND plant) OR (Power 
AND plant) OR (Energy AND policy) OR (Green AND energy) OR (Survey AND 
energy) OR (Survey AND Fukushima) OR (Poll AND energy) OR (Poll AND 
Fukushima) OR (Protest AND energy) OR (Protest AND Fukushima) OR 
(Demonstration AND energy) OR (Demonstration AND Fukushima) OR (Declaration 
AND energy) OR (Declaration AND Fukushima) OR (Claim AND energy) OR (Claim 
AND Fukushima) OR Greenpeace OR (Expert* AND energy) OR (Expert* AND 
Fukushima) OR Uranium 
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Summary of inter-coder reliability scores 
 
Table A1. Inter-coder reliability scores with 20 events and 19 coders  
Var 
Number Description of variable Krippendorff Alpha (method) 
v5a; 1 Day of event 0.99 (interval) 
v5b; 2 Month of event 0.98 (interval) 
v5c; 3 Year of event 1 (interval) 
v11; 4 Type of event 0.61 (nominal); 0.75 (nominal, using first digit) 
v13e1; 10 Number of participants 0.41 (interval) 
v14a; 13 Type of Actor General 0.71 (nominal) 
v14b; 14 Type of Actor Specific 0.47 (nominal); 0.75 (nominal) with first digit 
v14d; 15, 
21 Policy position Relative to Government 
0.69 (nominal) 
0.80 (if recoded as ordinal) 
v14d1; 16 Direction and intensity of Position 0.89 (ordinal) 
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Figure A1: Number of events by event type per month 
 
Note: The numbers indicate how many events per type (rows) occurred each month. 
The vertical lines indicate a change in government. 
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